# Heideggery Neg

### 1NC—Cyborgs

#### Their ontological “anti-humanism” is the philosophy of humanism par excellence. The location of Dasein as uniquely human, or even as somehow authentic, rests on a metaphysical boundary of exclusion.

Calarco ‘7 Matthew Calarco, “Jamming the Anthropological Machine,” On Agamben – Sovereignty and Life, 2007, p. 176-177, BAM

One of the key theses of The Open is that Heidegger’s thinking— despite its uncompromisingly critical relation to humanism—does little more than replicate the inner logic of the anthropological machine. The majority of the second half of The Open is taken up with a lengthy and intricate reading of Heidegger, in which Agamben attempts to demonstrate how Heidegger’s scattered remarks on the difference between human Dasein and animal life implicitly obeys the inclusionary/exclusionary logic of the anthropological machine. Focusing primarily on Heidegger’s Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics and Parmenides lecture courses, Agamben’s reading of these texts stresses the proximity of human Dasein with animal life, as well as the essential continuity that binds human and animal in their shared “captivation” by beings in their respective environments. As Agamben understands the matter, human Dasein differs from its animal other only by the very smallest of differences. What allows human Dasein to emerge in its singularity, along with the world relation and political possibilities concomitant with the emergence of Dasein, is simply that human animals have the unique capacity to grasp, or catch sight of, their being-captivated, a possibility that is (presumably) blocked off for animal life: Man, in the experience of profound boredom, has risked himself in the suspension of his relationship with the environment as a living being. . . . [He is able] to remember captivation an instant before a world disclosed itself. . . . Dasein is simply an animal that has learned to become bored; it has awakened from its own captivation to its own captivation. This awakening of the living being to its own being- captivated, this anxious and resolute opening to a not-open, is the human. (O, 70) In this “brief instant” before world opens, in the moment when the human animal awakens from its captivation to its captivation, human Dasein is thrust into the “space” or opening of the ontological difference. This is a topos that usually is hidden but that surfaces in certain moods such as anxiety and boredom, moods in which the tight grip of captivation that binds human beings to other beings in the world gives way to the malaise and uncanniness of the indifference of other beings. Inasmuch as Heidegger’s account of the emergence of human Dasein is predicated on the capture and exclusion of the animal’s particular mode of relation (namely, Benommenheit, captivation) to other beings, Agamben suggests that his thinking follows in lockstep with the logic of the anthropological machine. And Heidegger’s political thought—especially that of the early to mid-1930s—provides an even clearer example of how the anthropological machine is at play throughout his writings, as Heidegger seeks in these writings to “ground” political life in the unique world relation of human Dasein, which, in An Introduction to Metaphysics, is explicitly contrasted with the “worldless” realm of animal life. It is arguable whether Heidegger ever gave up the aim of uncovering a new political or historical task for human beings. If he did in fact recognize the error of doing so along nationalistic lines, it is unclear whether he gave up hope in uncovering some other “ground” for re- orienting human existence. At the very least, we can be certain that Heidegger’s thinking remains beholden to the logic of the anthropological machine from beginning to end. Heidegger never renounces the task of determining the proper of the human (as Da-sein, ek-sistence, etc.), and of thinking through the redemption of nature (i.e., the letting be of beings in their Being) that would occur were this human propriety to be assumed as such.

#### Far from simply alienating animals and reducing them to “standing reserve,” science has emerged as a tool to reshape the metaphysical divide between us and animals.

Haraway 91—Donna Haraway [Awesome philosopher with a Phd in biology], "A Cyborg Manifesto Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century," in Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York; Routledge, 1991), pp.149-181. <http://www.egs.edu/faculty/haraway/haraway-a-cyborg-manifesto.html>

I will return to the science fiction of cyborgs at the end of this chapter, but now I want to signal three crucial boundary breakdowns that make the following political-fictional (political-scientific) analysis possible. By the late twentieth century in United States scientific culture, the boundary between human and animal is thoroughly breached. The last beachheads of uniqueness have been polluted if not turned into amusement parks--language tool use, social behaviour, mental events, nothing really convincingly settles the separation of human and animal. And many people no longer feel the need for such a separation; indeed, many branches of feminist culture affirm the pleasure of connection of human and other living creatures. Movements for animal rights are not irrational denials of human uniqueness; they are a clear-sighted recognition of connection across the discredited breach of nature and culture. Biology and evolutionary theory over the last two centuries have simultaneously produced modern organisms as objects of knowledge and reduced the line between humans and animals to a faint trace re-etched in ideological struggle or professional disputes between life and social science. Within this framework, teaching modern Christian creationism should be fought as a form of child abuse.

#### The K of technology misses the boat—the segregation of “nature” from “machine” is anthropocentric metaphysics

Haraway 91—Donna Haraway [Awesome philosopher with a PhD in biology], "A Cyborg Manifesto Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century," in Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York; Routledge, 1991), pp.149-181. <http://www.egs.edu/faculty/haraway/haraway-a-cyborg-manifesto.html>

The second leaky distinction is between animal-human (organism) and machine. Pre-cybernetic machines could be haunted; there was always the spectre of the ghost in the machine. This dualism structured the dialogue between materialism and idealism that was settled by a dialectical progeny, called spirit or history, according to taste. But basically machines were not self-moving, self-designing, autonomous. They could not achieve man's dream, only mock it. They were not man, an author to himself, but only a caricature of that masculinist reproductive dream. To think they were otherwise was paranoid. Now we are not so sure. Late twentieth-century machines have made thoroughly ambiguous the difference between natural and artificial, mind and body, self-developing and externally designed, and many other distinctions that used to apply to organisms and machines. Our machines are disturbingly lively, and we ourselves frighteningly inert.

#### From this perspective, their conception of Dasein is particularly problematic. We are in the midst of a war on pity. The positioning of “angst” and “being towards death” as structural of human dasein takes the side of denial of the suffering of non-humans. Recognizing the suffering of animals must be prior to any ontological inquiry.

Derrida ‘2—Jacques Derrida was a super awesome philosopher and David Wills is a professor of French and English at the University of Albany, 2002 (“The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)“;Critical Inquiry, vol. 28, No. 2; Winter 2002, www.jstor.org/stable/1344276)

With this question-"can they suffer?"-we are not standing on the rock of indubitable certainty, the foundation of every assurance that one could, for example, look for in the cogito, inJe pense donc je suis. But from another perspective we are here putting our trust in an instance that is just as radical, however different it may be, namely, what is undeniable. No one can deny the suffering, fear or panic, the terror or fright that humans witness in certain animals. (Descartes himself was not able to claim that animals were insensitive to suffering.) Some will still try-this is something else we will come to-to contest the right to call that suffering or anguish, words or concepts that they would still reserve for man and for the Dasein in the freedom of its being-towards-death. We will have reason to problematize that discourse later. But for the moment let us note the following: the response to the question "can they suffer?" Leaves no doubt. In fact it has never left any room for doubt; that is why the experience that we have of it is not even indubitable; it precedes the indubitable, it is older than it. No doubt either, then, for the possibility of our giving vent to a surge of compassion, even if it is then misunderstood, repressed, or denied, held in respect. Before the undeniable of this response (yes, they suffer, like us who suffer for them and with them), before this response that precedes all other questions, the problematic changes ground and base. Perhaps it loses all security, but in any case it no longer rests on the old, supposedly natural (its ground) or historic and artifactual (its base) foundation. The two centuries I have been referring to somewhat approximately in order to situate the present in terms of this tradition have been those of an unequal struggle, a war being waged, the unequal forces of which could one day be reversed, between those who violate not only animal life but even and also this sentiment of compassion and, on the other hand, those who appeal to an irrefutable testimony to this pity. War is waged over the matter of pity. This war probably has no age but, and here is my hypothesis, it is passing through a critical phase. We are passing through that phase and it passes through us. To think the war we find ourselves waging is not only a duty, a responsibility, an obligation, it is also a necessity, a constraint that, like it or not, directly or indirectly, everyone is held to. Henceforth and more than ever. And I say "to think" this war, because I believe it concerns what we call "thinking." The animal looks at us, and we are naked before it. Thinking perhaps begins there.

#### The impacts:

#### First, the dividing line between “authentic dasein” and “technological machines” only replicates the segregation of “humans” and “animals”—the problem is not they claim a difference but that these are seen as polar opposites. The creation of this metaphysical boundary is the worst possible violence turning the aff

Lawlor ‘7—Leonard Lawlor [is Faudree-Hardin Professor of Philosophy at The University of Memphis, author of a handful of books, and editor of a couple journals], "Animals Have No Hand” An Essay on Animality in Derrida, CR: The New Centennial Review 7.2 (2007) 43-69, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/new_centennial_review/v007/7.2lawlor.html>

We are trying set up the possibility of a more sufﬁcient response to what Derrida, in L'animal que donc je suis, calls a "war of the species." This war is part of globalization, which is itself a form of war, a form of paciﬁcation of all opponents; it is, in fact, as Derrida says in "Faith and Knowledge," "globalatinization" (1998a). But with globalatinization, we see as well that its universal movement erodes the borders between nation-states. The erosion of the borders, for Derrida, increases the probability of the worst happening. The structure of the worst amounts to making two into one: it is a form of totalization. Or, it attempts to separate one from the other in order to make one alone: man apart from animal, man apart from the parasite, man unscathed and apart from (to use one of Derrida's "old names") the "pharmakon." In "Plato's Pharmacy," we encountered the [End Page 43] pharmakon as the "mixture-element," the element which is itself a mixture (1972a, 146; 1981, 127). But more importantly, the pharmakon is ambivalent; it has no value in itself (it is nevertheless not monovalent) (1972a, 144–45; 1981, 126–27); the pharmakon in fact destabilizes all value positing. The pharmakon then is violence itself (or even radical evil in the sense of evil at the root, "arche-violence" [1967a, 164–65; 1974, 112]), violence that we are not able to eliminate, a violence that indicates a fundamental weakness or fault in us, in all living beings. The worst violence, however, consists in precisely the attempt to eliminate the evil of the pharmakon once and for all. In contrast, what we are seeking is a more sufﬁcient response to this worst violence, a response that is more sufficient than the reductionism of biological continuity and the separationism of a metaphysical opposition. All attempts bound up with the question of the self (the autos or ipse), such as animal rights (based on the idea of human rights), fall into one of these two sides: biological continuism or metaphysical separationism. The more sufﬁcient response means that we do not and should not want to completely eliminate the minimal violence. What we are seeking is a lesser violence, even the least violence.

#### Second, the obsession with authenticity robs us of our encounters with difference. Paradoxically, it is in the radical alterity of the non-human that most of us encounter death as such—for example, in the death of a pet—and thus the essential locus for the aff. Our response should not be one of ontology but of ethics

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Let us strip the demonstration down one more time to its essential structure. If what most properly deﬁnes human existence is the fault or defect of being mortal (or, more precisely, if understanding the possibility of mortality as possibility is what most properly deﬁnes us), then we are able to say that we truly understand that possibility only if we have access to death as such in the presence of a moment—in the blink of the eye, in indivisible and silent sovereignty, secretly. But, since we only ever have access to the possibility of death as something other than possibility—that is, as impossibility, as something blinding, as something shared across countless others—we cannot say that we understand the possibility of death truly, naked even. Then, the being of us, our fault, resembles the fault of animals.22 The fault now has been generalized, and therefore so has evil. The resemblance between us and them in regard to the fault or evil, however, does not mean that [End Page 64] we have anthropomorphized the animals; it does not mean that we have succumbed to the risk of biological continuism. With this resemblance, we have what Derrida, in Of Spirit, calls "une analogie décalée": "a staggered analogy" (1987d, 81; 1989b). There is a nonsimultaneity between us and them, between us and the other. This nonsimultaneity comes with time or, rather, is "from time" ("depuis le temps"), as Derrida says in L'animal que donc je suis (2006, 40; 2002a, 390), "from always" ("depuis toujours"), as he says in "The Ends of Man" (1972b, 147; 1982, 123). What these phrases mean is clear: there is a fault, and yet there is no fall. The nonsimultaneity is always there, in all of us, in the Geschlecht or genus or genre or gender or race or family or generation that we are. The Geschlecht is always verwesende, "de-essenced" (1987d, 143; 1989b, 91). The fault that divides, being there in us, means that all of us are not quite there, not quite Da, not quite dwelling, or rather all of us are living out of place, in a sort of nonplace, in the indeterminate place called kho¯ra, about which we can say that it is neither animal nor divine—nor human, or that it is both animal and divine—and human. Indeterminate, the nonplace contains countless divisions, countless faults. All of us living together in this nonplace, we see now, is based in the fact that all living beings can end ("Finis," as in the title of the ﬁrst essay found in Aporias) (see also 1996a, 76; 1993a, 39). All the living beings are mortal (2006, 206), and that means we can speak of "the ends of animal" (113; translation mine). All the living beings share in this weakness, in this lack of power, in "this impotence [impuissance] at the heart of power" (2006, 49; 2002a, 396). All of us have this fault. Therefore we can return to a question we raised earlier: are not all of us "poor in world"? This "poverty" ("Ar-mut," in German) implies a "feeling oneself poor," a kind of passion, a kind of suffering (2006, 213; translation mine).23 Therefore, when an animal looks at me, does it not address itself to me, mutely, with its eyes? Does it not implore, just as Derrida's cat looks at him, imploring him to set it free (from the bathroom)? And does not this look imply that, like us, animals suffer? The suffering of animals is undeniable (2006, 49; 2002a, 396). As Derrida always says in relation to these sorts of formulas, this undeniability means that we can only deny it, and deny it in countless ways. Yet, none of these denials of the suffering of animals will have been sufficient! [End Page 65]

#### The Ontology of the animal comes first. Refusing a position of ethics and shared pathos with non-humans is the basis of constant genocide

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All that is well known; we have no need to dwell on it. However one interprets it, whatever practical, technical, scientific, juridical, ethical, or political consequence one draws from it, no one can deny this event any more, no one can deny the unprecedented proportions of this subjection of the animal. Such a subjection, whose history we are attempting to interpret, can be called violence in the most morally neutral sense of the term and even includes a certain interventionist violence that is practiced, as in some very minor and in no way dominant cases, let us never forget, in the service of and for the protection of the animal, most often the human animal. Neither can one seriously deny the disavowal that this involves. No one can deny seriously, or for very long, that men do all they can in order to dissimulate this cruelty or to hide it from themselves, in order to organize on a global scale the forgetting or misunderstanding of this violence that some would compare to the worst cases of genocide (there are also animal genocides: the number of species endangered because of man takes one's breath away). One should neither abuse the figure of genocide nor consider it explained away. For it gets more complicated here: the annihilation of certain species is indeed in process, but it is occurring through the organization and exploitation of an artificial, infernal, virtually interminable survival, in conditions that previous generations would have judged monstrous, outside of every supposed norm of a life proper to animals that are thus exterminated by means of their continued existence or even their overpopulation. As if, for example, instead of throwing people into ovens or gas chambers (let's say Nazi) doctors and geneticists had decided to organize the overproduction and overgeneration of Jews, gypsies, and homosexuals by means of artificial insemination, so that, being more numerous and better fed, they could be destined in always increasing numbers for the same hell, that of the imposition of genetic experimentation or extermination by gas or by fire. In the same abattoirs. I don't wish to abuse the ease with which one can overload with pathos the self-evidences I am drawing attention to here. Everybody knows what terrifying and intolerable pictures a realist painting could give to the industrial, mechanical, chemical, hormonal, and genetic violence to which man has been submitting animal life for the past two centuries. Everybody knows what the production, breeding, transport, and slaughter of these animals has become. Instead of thrusting these images in your faces or awakening them in your memory, something that would be both too easy and endless, let me simply say a word about this "pathos." If these images are "pathetic," if they evoke sympathy, it is also because they "pathetically" open the immense question of pathos and the pathological, precisely, that is, of suffering, pity, and compassion; and the place that has to be accorded to the interpretation of this compassion, to the sharing of this suffering among the living, to the law, ethics, and politics that must be brought to bear upon this experience of compassion. For what has been happening now for two centuries involves a new experience of this compassion. In response to the irresistible but unacknowledged unleashing and the organized disavowal of this torture, voices are raised- minority, weak, marginal voices, little assured of their discourse, of their right to discourse and of the enactment of their discourse within the law, as a declaration of rights-in order to protest, in order to appeal (we'll return to this) to what is still presented in such a problematic way as animal rights, in order to awaken us to our responsibilities and our obligations with respect to the living in general, and precisely to this fundamental compassion that, were we to take it seriously, would have to change even the very basis (and that basis is what I wish to discuss today) of the philosophical problematic of the animal.

#### The alternative is to situate our encounter with Being as the being of cyborgs.

#### Locating politics in the cyborg does blasphemy to stable identities. Goodbye western metaphysics, the new life is boundary crossing.

Haraway 91—Donna Haraway [Awesome philosopher with a Phd in biology], "A Cyborg Manifesto Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century," in Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York; Routledge, 1991), pp.149-181. <http://www.egs.edu/faculty/haraway/haraway-a-cyborg-manifesto.html>

This chapter is an effort to build an ironic political myth faithful to feminism, socialism, and materialism. Perhaps more faithful as blasphemy is faithful, than as reverent worship and identification. Blasphemy has always seemed to require taking things very seriously. I know no better stance to adopt from within the secular-religious, evangelical traditions of United States politics, including the politics of socialist feminism. Blasphemy protects one from the moral majority within, while still insisting on the need for community. Blasphemy is not apostasy. Irony is about contradictions that do not resolve into larger wholes, even dialectically, about the tension of holding incompatible things together because both or all are necessary and true. Irony is about humour and serious play. It is also a rhetorical strategy and a political method, one I would like to see more honoured within socialist-feminism. At the centre of my ironic faith, my blasphemy, is the image of the cyborg. A cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction. Social reality is lived social relations, our most important political construction, a world-changing fiction. The international women's movements have constructed 'women's experience', as well as uncovered or discovered this crucial collective object. This experience is a fiction and fact of the most crucial, political kind. Liberation rests on the construction of the consciousness, the imaginative apprehension, of oppression, and so of possibility. The cyborg is a matter of fiction and lived experience that changes what counts as women's experience in the late twentieth century. This is a struggle over life and death, but the boundary between science fiction and social reality is an optical illusion. Contemporary science fiction is full of cyborgs — creatures simultaneously animal and machine, who populate worlds ambiguously natural and crafted. Modern medicine is also full of cyborgs, of couplings between organism and machine, each conceived as coded devices, in an intimacy and with a power that was not generated in the history of sexuality. Cyborg 'sex' restores some of the lovely replicative baroque of ferns and invertebrates (such nice organic prophylactics against heterosexism). Cyborg replication is uncoupled from organic reproduction. Modern production seems like a dream of cyborg colonization work, a dream that makes the nightmare of Taylorism seem idyllic. And modern war is a cyborg orgy, coded by C3I, command-control-communication-intelligence, an $84 billion item in 1984's US defence budget. I am making an argument for the cyborg as a fiction mapping our social and bodily reality and as an imaginative resource suggesting some very fruitful couplings. Michael Foucault's biopolitics is a flaccid premonition of cyborg politics, a very open field.

### New Materialisms

#### They talk a lot of hot water about ontology but their Heideggerian understanding of it makes their ontological investigation meaningless: Heidegger revolutionized ontology by converting the question of Being as such into the question of Being as it is for Dasein, thus retreating into quote “correlational” analysis. They aren’t asking the question of Being—Instead, they’re asking the question of Being for-Dasein—the kritik is a prior condition to solvency.

Bryant 2011 (Levi, Prof. Philosophy Collin College, *The Democracy of Objects*, Online)CJQ

Our historical moment is characterized by a general distrust, even disdain, for the category of objects, ontology, and above all any variant of realism. Moreover, it is characterized by a primacy of epistemology over ontology. While it is indeed true that Heidegger, in Being and Time, attempted to resurrect ontology, this only took place through a profound transformation of the very meaning of ontology. [8] Ontology would no longer be the investigation of being qua being in all its variety and diversity regardless of whether humans exist, but rather would instead become an interrogation of Dasein's or human being's access to being. Ontology would become an investigation of being-for-Dasein, rather than an investigation of being as such. In conjunction with this transformation of ontology from an investigation of being as such into an investigation of being-for-humans, we have also everywhere witnessed a push to dissolve objects or primary substances in the acid of experience, intentionality, power, language, normativity, signs, events, relations, or processes. To defend the existence of objects is, within the framework of this line of thought, the height of naïveté for objects are held to be nothing more than surface-effects of something more fundamental such as the signifier, signs, power or activities of the mind. With Hume, for example, it is argued that objects are really nothing more than bundles of impressions or sensations linked together by associations and habits in the mind. Here there is no deeper fact of objects existing beyond these impressions and habits. Likewise, Lacan will tell us that “the universe is the flower of rhetoric”[9], treating the beings that populate the world as an effect of the signifier. We can thus discern a shift in how ontology is understood and accompanying this shift the deployment of a universal acid that has come to dissolve the being of objects. The new ontology argues that we can only ever speak of being as it is for us. Depending on the philosophy in question, this “us” can be minds, lived bodies, language, signs, power, social structures, and so on. There are dozens of variations. The key point here is that it is argued that being can only be thought in terms of what Graham Harman has called our access to being.[10] As such, ontology becomes not an interrogation of being as such, but rather an interrogation of our access to being. The answer to the question, “what is being?” now, everywhere and always, carries a footnote, colophon, or bit of fine print such that the question must be read as “what is being for us?” And if the question of ontology now becomes the question, “what is being for us?” it follows that there can be no question of what being might be as such, for we have resolved to treat being only in terms of our access to being such that what being might be apart from our access to being now becomes an entirely meaningless question. This for two reasons: First, were we capable of knowing being apart from our access to being, it is argued, it would follow that we therefore have access to this being, thereby converting this being alleged to be beyond its givenness to us back into being-for-us. Second, to know something, the argument runs, we must have access to that thing. Yet being beyond our access to it is precisely a form of being to which we have no access. Therefore it follows that claims about such a being are, strictly speaking, meaningless. I hope to show later why there is good reason to doubt the soundness of both of these arguments, but for the moment it is enough simply to tarry with them to understand their logic, for these arguments constitute the basic schema of nearly every reigning philosophical position today.

#### Knowledge-centric correlationism is disastrous. It ignores that which isn’t like us, producing ethical oversights and political failures.

Bryant ’12 Levi Bryant, “Worries About OOO and Politics,” Larval Subjects, 5/29/2012, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/05/29/worries-about-ooo-and-politics/

2) Correlationism and its Discontents: For me, at least, the desire to overcome correlationism does not arise out of some pure speculative desire to “get at the things themselves”, but because I believe that correlationism has noxious political consequences that cultivate an attitude destructive to effective political practice or engagement. As Stacy Alaimo, who is not an OOO theorist but who is very close to my onticology in many respects puts it, Matter, the vast stuff of the world and of ourselves, has been subdivided into manageable “bits” or flattened into a “blank slate” for human inscription. The environment has been drained of its blood, its lively creatures, its interactions and relations– in short, all that is recognizable as “nature” –in order that it become a mere empty space, an “uncontested ground,” for human “development”. (Bodily Natures, 1 – 2) Correlationism trains us to see all other material things as alienated images of ourselves in a mirror. The question always becomes “what are things for us?”, and the thesis is that matter is merely a brute passive stuff awaiting our inscriptions. In other words, the basic gesture that become dominant in cultural theory beginning around the 60′s was to show that what we take to be objects are really our own significations that we fail to recognize as our own. A critical analysis– modeled on Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism but diverging quite significantly from hismaterialism –thus came to consist in revealing how these significations come from us, rather than from the things themselves. Now, as I have said, both here and elsewhere, I have no desire to abandon this form of analysis. As I argue, all entities translate other entities in particular ways and this is no less true of humans. However, the problem with this style of analysis is that it renders invisible the differences contributed by nonhuman objects to social assemblages. We come to think that it is just significations that structure social assemblages and that if we want to change social assemblages all we have to do is critique and debunk significations or ideologies. Clearly critiquing and debunking ideologies is a part of changing social assemblages, but it is not the only part. And because correlationism functions as a theoretical axiom where we don’t even recognize the existence of this other part– say rice –because it treats the only real difference as signifying difference, we find ourselves surprised when we’ve adequately critiqued and debunked signifying systems and the social system doesn’t change. Perhaps this would clue us into the possibility that perhaps there are other actors involved in these social assemblages, holding people in place in particular ways. The problem is that correlationism tends to render non-signifying differences in social assemblages invisible because it begins from the axiom that nonhuman things are just blank slates awaiting our inscription. Anyone who’s ever gardened knows that this can’t possibly be true. The diacritical nature of how I signify “tomato” will not make my tomatoes grow any better. No, to grow tomatoes I have to navigate soil conditions, sunlight and heat (which are quite substantial here in Texas), the gangs of roving rabbits that populate my back yard, insects, worms, water, etc. I am enmeshed in an entire network of actors that contribute to whether or not the tomatoes will grow and, more importantly, I must constantly attend to these nonhuman actors. The point here is not, as Berry suggests, to diminish human political interventions and promote a troubling conservatism, but to expand the sites of political intervention as well as our possibilities of acting. We cannot effectively act and change things if we don’t know how the assemblages within which we are enmeshed are put together, what actors are present in those assemblages, and how we might intervene on these actors to change our social possibilities. Correlationism tends to draw our attention to only one type of actor– the signifier –and while this is a real actor it is not the only one.

#### Text: Vote negative to adopt a phenomenology of objects.

#### Becoming attentive to the activities of nonhuman objects is a prerequisite to the affirmative. This broadens our ethical perspectives and produces more effective political solutions.

Joy ’12 Eileen Joy, SIU-Edwardsville Dept. of English Language and Literature, response to “the object industry,” by Alex Reid, Digital Digs, 5/29/2012, http://www.alex-reid.net/2012/05/the-object-industry.html

I'd like to add a few "follow-on" comments to what Ian writes below; these are partly borrowed from an interview I was \*supposed\* to finish and never did [where someone posed questions to me and I wrote answers back], where the same critique was raised regarding posthumanism [I also want to add here that I don't see Alex and Berry on the same page here; indeed, I think Alex's position is much more nuanced with regard to the ethical promise of flat ontologies, even with his cautions, which, I just don't worry about as much, partly because my mantra these days is: "more thought," without too much worrying over where it will all lead]: Calling oneself a post/humanist or "new humanist" (as I do, btw) or turning one’s attention to objects (as Bennett, Bryant, Harman, and others are doing at present) or to animals (as Cary Wolfe, Karl Steel, Cora Diamond, Sarah Franklin, Julian Yates, Nicole Shukin, and others are doing), etc., is decidedly not about discarding the human altogether, nor even necessarily about de-specializing it, as some have argued. Rather, in my mind, it is more about re-tooling human mentality to stall, idle, and with an enhanced sensibility (with which the human is specially gifted) to pick up on "signals" it heretofore had not been listening for. I have written elsewhere about the human as a special listening device or slow recorder. It is not a rejection of “world,” either (as in: this world), although figures like Brassier and Meillassoux, of course, have pointed in that direction (I am personally not so enchanted with the eliminativist and “dark vitalist” positions, whether nihilist or culinary or materialist or whatever, although I think they're amazingly imaginative and I support and encourage that work because what we need now is more, and not less, thinking in the university). I get very worked up on this point because I have become distressed lately by how many people want to make the argument that post/humanism, as well as OOO work, isn’t attentive enough to the contexts in which so-called “real lives” unfold on the grounds of “real world” contexts, or that it somehow chooses dogs over people dying in Sudan, or spools of thread over migrant workers in textile factories, and so on and so forth. In other words, if we’re paying too much attention to objects or animals, we’ve somehow abdicated our attention to and responsibility for those -- who are human -- living alongside us and who might be suffering under oppressive regimes, who are disenfranchised, who are experiencing various forms of violence and deprivations, etc. We supposedly care more about popsicle sticks and less about poverty in America. I have this image in my mind of a big “you’re not political/human/ethical enough” factory and inside of this massive brick building with all sorts of discursive smoke-stacks there are all these people pulling on levers and pulleys and turning wheels and conveyer belts and one lever is marked “you forgot about the poverty in Calcutta” and another one is marked “but there are real people dying in Sudan” and another one is marked “people need jobs, then we’ll talk about the democracy of objects” and another one is marked “when we get beyond racism, then we’ll talk about animals” and another one (that seems to have been engineered just for critiques of Harman, especially) is marked “since you only want to pay attention to the singularity and autonomy and ‘mystery’ of objects, you must not care very much about the fact that the ‘real world’ is mainly shaped by relations, and uneven ones at that” and so on and so on ad infinitum. For me personally, turning one’s attention to animals, objects, post/humanism and so on is precisely about thickening our capacity to imagine more capacious forms of “living with”; it is precisely about developing more radical forms of welcoming and generosity to others, who include humans as well as trees, rocks, dogs, cornfields, ant colonies, pvc pipes, and sewer drains; it is precisely about amplifying the ability of our brains to pick up more communication signals from more “persons” (who might be a human or a cloud or a cave) whose movements, affects, and thoughts are trying to tell us something about our interconnectedness and co-implicated interdependence with absolutely everything (or perhaps even about a certain implicit alienation between everything in the world, which is nevertheless useful to understand better: take your pick); it is precisely about working toward a more capacious vision of what we mean by “well-being,” when we decide to attend to the well-being of humans and other “persons” (who might be economic markets or the weather or trash or homeless cats) who are always enmeshed with each other in various “vibrant” networks, assemblages, meshes, cascades, systems, whathaveyou. And just for me -- likely, just for me -- it is also about love, with love defined, not as something that goes in one direction from one person to another person or object (carrying with it various demands and expectations and self-centered desires), but rather, as a type of collective labor that works at creating “fields” for persons and objects to emerge into view that otherwise would remain hidden (and perhaps also remain abjectified), and which persons and objects could then be allowed the breathing/living room to unfold in various self-directed ways, even if that’s not what you could have predicted in advance nor supposedly what you “want” it to do (in other words: ethics as a form of attention that is directed toward the “for-itself” propulsions of other persons and objects, human and inhuman). So, for me, work in post/humanism, and in OOO, is attentive to the world, which includes and does not exile (or gleefully kill off) the human (although it certainly asks that we expand our angles of vision beyond just the human-centered ones); it is both political and ethical; and it is interested in what I would even call the “tender” attention to and care of things, human and inhuman (I think that the work of Bennett, Bogost, Morton, Harman, Steven Shaviro, Jeffrey Cohen, Stacy Alaimo, Julian Yates, Myra Hird, Freya Matthews, Karen Barad, Donna Haraway, and Levi Bryant, and many, many others who \*never\* get cited in these discussions, especially the women working in materialism, science/gender studies, queer ecology, environmental humanities, etc.) especially exemplifies this “tender” attention to and care of all of the "items" of the world. Any enlargement of our capacity to think about the agential, signaling, and other capacities of as many items/objects/persons, etc. of this world represents, in my mind, an enlargement, and not a shrinking, of our ethical attention. It's asking for a richer, thicker ontology, which gives is more to be responsible for (after all, that's partly where the specialness of humans comes in), but also: more to enjoy.